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NoTEs AND CoiArE'rs
IMMUNITY STATUTES-ADAMS V. STATE OF MARYLAND
In response to a summons one Adams appeared to testify before
a Senate Committee investigating crime. In answering questions he
confessed to having run a gambling business in Maryland. Subsequently, that confession was used in convicting him of conspiring to
violate Maryland's anti-lottery laws. He was fined and sentenced to
the penitentiary by the trial court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed, rejecting Adams' contention that use of the committee testimony against him was forbidden by a provision of the federal statute.1
The Maryland Court of Appeals held that Adams was not protected
by the federal statute, sinae he waived the statutory privilege by
testifying voluntarily, and further, that the statute should be construed
so as to apply to federal courts only. On certiorari, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the federal statute in declaring
that no testimony given by a witness in congressional inquiries shall
be used as evidence in any criminal proceedings against him in any
court, precluded the use of such evidence in state courts as well as
federal courts, without necessity of a claim by the witness of a con2
stitutional privilege as to each question asked of him.
This case, it is felt, is worthy of discussion because of the ever
increasing use of immunity statutes by legislative bodies in carrying
on their governmental functions. Immunity statutes have been a
constant source of confusion since the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Walker.3
It is to be noted that there are three types of so-called immunity
statutes. There is the type statute which provides complete immunity
running both to the federal and state jurisdictions; 4 second, is the
type which calls for complete immunity to be given only in the federal
or state jurisdiction; 5 third, the "partial immunity" statute which provides that only the testimony given shall not be used in either a state
or federal jurisdiction6 or that the evidence given shall supply an immunity in that jurisdiction. 7 This comment will discuss these different
type statutes in the order in which they appear above.
The first type statute supplies an immunity which is fully co-ex1"No testimony given by a witness before either House, or before any committee of either House, or before any joint committee established by a joint or
concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, shall be used as evidence in
any criminal proceeding against him in any court, except in a prosecution for
perjury committed in giving such testimony. But an official paper or record produced by him is not within the said privilege." 18 U. S. C. sec. 3486 (1948).
eAdams v. Maryland, 74 S. Ct. 442 (1954).
3161 U. S.591 (1896).
'49 U. S. C. sec. 46 (1893); U. S. v. Lee, 290 F. 517 (1923).
GEN. STAT. OF KANSAS 21-943 (1949); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
SSupra, note 2.
:Ky. fEv. STAT. 436.510 (1953).
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tensive with the privilege against self-incrimination and on reason
and logic seems to be the only one of the above mentioned three that
meets the test of "complete immunity." The Supreme Court in the
present case stated that there is little doubt that Congress has the
power to bar state courts from convicting a person for a crime on the
basis of evidence he has given to help the national legislative bodies
carry on their governmental functions, for they are given this power
under Article 1 of the Constitution.8 Thus, the Supreme Court intimates that its position might be different if it were called upon today
to decide what is "complete immunity" as it did earlier in the much
disputed Murdock case. 9 In that case the Court said:
The principle established is that full and complete immunity against
prosecution by the government compelling the witness to answer is
equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule against compelling
self-incrimination. 10 (Italics supplied)

Thus, the present rule is that a person under examination in a federal
tribunal cannot refuse to answer on grounds that he may be prosecuted
under state law. It would seem that a government that has the power
to prevent the prosecution of a person in another jurisdiction upon
evidence given before it, or due to clues which might lead from that
evidence, cannot be said to have given "complete immunity" when it
only gives half of which it is capable of giving. If we were to isolate
the Fifth Amendment from the rest of the Constitution then it could
be said that the federal government has given complete immunity.
But when considered in conjunction with Article 1 of the Constitution
it is readily seen that complete immunity has not been given by a
statute which extends the immunity to the federal jurisdiction only.
The problem of state immunity statutes presents itself in a little
different light. In this country the privilege against self-incrimination
has carried beyond the bounds of a mere rule of evidence and has
found incorporation in the federal and all the state constitutions except those of Iowa and New Jersey. 10 Iowa recognizes it under her
due process clause, while New Jersey treats it as a rule of evidence.
Thus, where the states have incorporated the privilege against selfincrimination into their constitutions their courts have held, in line
with the Murdock decision, that "complete immunity" which is coextensive with the privilege is satisfied when given in only that
jurisdiction. The reason predominantly given is that the states are
powerless to dictate to the federal government and invade its jurisdiction. But it is submitted that the problem is one of interpretation
8

Supra, note 1 at 446.
' United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1981).
"Old.at 149.

NoTEs An ComnMNs

rather than one of limitation of power. When state courts are called
upon to interpret their immunity statutes, it is submitted that they
should first inquire and satisfy themselves as to whether there is any
imminent or substantial danger that the witness before them will be
prosecuted in a federal court due to the evidence or clues furnished
by him if forced to testify in the state proceedings; if not, and the
state statute provides immunity in that jurisdiction, then the witness
should not be compelled to testify. If there is the danger of prosecution in the federal courts then an immunity co-extensive with the
privilege has not been granted and the witness cannot be compelled
to testify.
The type of immunity statute which grants immunity in only the
one jurisdiction-Federal or State-provides grossly inadequate protection. It is not hard to visualize a concerted action on the part of
federal and state officers in order that a federal conviction might be
had, or vice versa; especially such collusion as that which undoubtedly
has taken place under the present interpretation of the search and
seizure clause of the Constitution. Such logic places a false vaue on
jurisdictional lines and powers in a system of government as interrelated as ours.
The third type statute, or that granting only immunity from the
use of testimony, is in reality not an immunity statute in the sense of
an immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination.
The statute in the case now under consideration is of this type. Upon
close scrutiny it will be noticed that it is not a "compelling statute,"
that is, the witness may invoke his constitutional privilege against self
incrimination without fear of being cited for contempt, for the statute
does not provide for complete immunity as defined in Counselman v.
Hitchcock.'1 The Supreme Court in that case held that an immunity
statute which merely provided protection against subsequent use of
a witness's testimony as evidence in a criminal prosecution against
him did not afford adequate protection. The Court pointed out that
although the testimony obtained could not itself be used as evidence
in a criminal proceeding, it might furnish clues leading to the discovery of other evidence which could be used. Hence, the statute
did not prevent a witness from invoking his constitutional privilege.
Mr. Justice Jackson made the same observation in the case now under
consideration, pointing out that this statute is not one which provides
complete immunity although it does have that appearance. 12 Can it
not be said then that a statute of this type is of an enticing nature and
a snare for the unwary?
142 U.S.547 (1892).
= 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
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It is completely unrealistic to construe the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination, whether occurring in a state or federal constitution, as permitting compulsion of a witness to testify when it is
certain or probable that he will be prosecuted in a court of the other
jurisdiction a few blocks away. The constitutional guarantee should
be given its full implication or it should be amended. Otherwise,
courts could give it full effect by refusing to compel testimony in any
situation where prosecution is likely to follow within either state or
federal jurisdiction. This could be done by judicial interpretation,
or if that would bring about confusion, then a declaratory statute
might be adopted to avoid conflict with previous decisions to the
contrary.
WENDELL SAFIrE

WILLIAMS

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF A DONOR OF AN
AUTOMOBILE-ESTES V. GIBSON
The plaintiff was injured when the defendant's adult son negligently ran an automobile, given to him by the defendant mother,
into a gasoline pump and caused an explosion which showered the
plaintiff with burning gasoline. The plaintiff brought an action against
the defendant mother, alleging that having knowledge, actual or constructive, that her son "by reason of his physical and mental condition
and by reason of his habits of insobriety and his addiction to the use of
hypnotic drugs and narcotics .. .was, at all times mentioned herein,
a careless, reckless and incompetent operator of a motor vehicle," she
carelessly and negligently purchased the automobile for her son, placed
it in his possession, and permitted and allowed him to operate it. The
title to the automobile at the time of the accident was in the son. The
defendant mother's general demurrer to the petition was sustained
and the complaint against her was dismissed. On appeal, held, judgment affirmed by a divided court, 4-3.1
It would seem that to sustain the general demurrer is to hold
flatly that, as a matter of law, one who transfers an automobile by gift
to an adult is not liable to a third party who is subsequently injured by
the negligent operation of the automobile by the donee, even if at the
time of the gift the donor had knowledge that the donee was an incompetent operator of any motor vehicle.
The decision of the majority seems to turn chiefly on the fact that
' Supra note 1 at 447.

'Estes v. Gibson, 257 S. W. 2d 604 (Ky. 1953).

